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Thoughts from Across the Water on
Hearsay and Confrontation
By Richard D. Friedman
Professor of Law, University of Michigan

Summary: This article draws on the history of the hearsay rule, and on recent decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights, to argue that the right to confrontation
should be recognised as a basic principle of the law of evidence, and that aspects of the
Law Commission's proposals for reform of the hearsay rule, and of the Home Office's
proposals for restrictions on the right of cross-examination, are therefore unsat
isfactory.
To an American scholar, it is reassuring to know that the English are as displeased
with their law of hearsay as we are with ours.On both sides of the Atlantic, the law
excludes highly probative evidence and causes unnecessary inconvenience and
expense, and it is extraordinarily complex and often irrational.1 As the Law
Commission has properly recognised-and as the drafters of our evidentiary rules
have not-it is desperately in need of reform.
At the same time, lurking within the rule against hearsay, and often shrouded by
its many excesses and oddities, is a principle of magnificent importance, a principle
first enunciated long before the development of the common law system but one
that achieved full development within that system.This is the principle that a person
may not offer testimony against a criminal defendant unless it is given under oath, face to
face with the accused and subject to cross-examination. It is this principle-and not
concerns about the reliability of hearsay evidence or the supposed inability of the
jury to deal with the weaknesses of evidence-that should drive the law concerning
secondary evidence.
This underlying principle is articulated-though sufficiently cryptically that our
Supreme Court has not recognised it2-in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that "(i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." I shall therefore refer to the principle as the confrontation
1 For the English side, see, e.g. Law Commission Report No. 245, Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (1997). Reasons for the "blight" are lucidly explored by
Colin Tapper in "Hearsay in Criminal Cases: An Overview of Law Commission Report No
245" [1997] Crim.LR. 771. For the American side, see, e.g. the papers from the Minnesota
Hearsay Reform Conference, (1992) 76 Minn.L.Rev. 363.
2 The Supreme Court has treated the Confrontation Clause, so far as it relates to out
of-court statements, very nearly as if it were a constitutionalisation of the provisions on hearsay
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g. White v. Illinois, (1992) 502 U.S. 346. I have
commented at length on this tendency in "Confrontation: The Search for First Principles"
(1998) 86 Georgetown L.J. 1011 (hereinafter "First Principles").
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principle. I use the term with some hesitance, however; although I believe the
principle should be implemented in full, it can be implemented in parts, and the
right to be brought face to face with the adverse witnesses is not necessarily the most
important part. One could say, for example-and recent decisions under the
European Convention on Human Rights indicate3-that in limited situations the
defendant may have the right to examine a witness through counsel but not the right
to have the witness testify in his presence.
That we in the United States should cling more tenaciously than do the English
to an institution that we inherited from England is not altogether surprising; the
same is true of the civil jury, and I have no doubt that we will still be dividing the
number of ounces by 16 and the number of inches by 12 long after England has
sensibly gone fully metric. What is very ironic, .however, is that the confrontation
principle, which for centuries English writers proclaimed as one of the chief aspects
of the superiority of the English adjudicative system over its Continental counter
parts, should now be pressed on the United Kingdom from the Continent. I submit
that developments under the European Convention, while not going quite as far as
might be wished, suggest a framework that could help us climb out of the
morass-careful protection of the confrontation right with respect to testimonial
statements, including such statements made out of court, without depending on the
rubric of hearsay law.

In this article, I will first argue that, so far as concern about the probative value
of the evidence is concerned, hearsay doctrine is misguided: if live testimony of the
declarant would advance the truth-determination process, then in most cases so too
would the declarant's hearsay statement. Thus, I contend, discourse about hearsay
has been conducted largely along unhelpful lines. I then sketch out the confronta
tion principle and its history, showing how its application to out-of-court statements
is one of the fundamental pillars of our system of adjudication. Finally, I show how
the principle accounts for some basic aspects of hearsay law that might otherwise
appear anomalous; how it points to other aspects of hearsay law that are genuinely
anomalous and ought to be eliminated; and how it suggests that in some respects
proposals in the Law Commission's Report No. 245, Hearsay and Related Topics, as
well as in the Home Office's report on the treatment of vulnerable or intimidated
witnesses, would be moves in the wrong direction.

If the approach suggested here were adopted, the result would be a doctrine of
considerably narrower scope than the current law of hearsay, but one not under
mined by a baffling and incongruous set of exceptions. The doctrine would not
eliminate all difficult questions of application-there will always be close cases-but
it would be based on a broad principle that can be rather easily understood and that
would command broad respect.

Hearsay as beneficial to truth-determination
The Law Commission Report, like most modern discourse about hearsay, is
pervaded by concern about truth-determination. Thus, the Report stresses the
factors that, at least since the time of Wigmore, have often been regarded as the
principal criteria for determining the admissibility of hearsay-reliability and, to a
lesser extent, necessity.
3

See the discussion of Doorson and Uzn Meche/en below in n.38.
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I will argue here that, to the extent that determination of truth is the goal, hearsay
should generally be admissible if the live testimony of the declarant to the same
proposition would be. The argument comes in several pieces. First, courts and rule
makers cannot satisfactorily sort out categories defining reliable evidence. Secondly,
evidence that is not particularly reliable will nevertheless assist the truth-determina
tion process so long as it is more probative than prejudicial. Thirdly, if live testimony
of the declarant as to a given proposition would be more probative than prejudicial,
then ordinarily so too will be the hearsay declaration, the supposed disabilities of the
jury notwithstanding. Fourthly, necessity as such adds little to the criterion; there is
need for good evidence and no need for bad evidence. The most persuasive way of
viewing the necessity criterion is perhaps as the inverse of a "best evidence"
criterion-when better evidence than the hearsay, the live testimony of the
declarant, is available, the need for the hearsay diminishes. But, so long as the
proponent is not in a substantially better position than is the opponent to produce
the declarant as a live witness, this rationale does not create a strong rationale for
excluding hearsay.
This discussion suggests that, to the extent the concern is the determination of
truth, courts and rule makers should generally be receptive to hearsay, even more
than the Law Commission Report suggests. And a corollary is that, to the extent
hearsay should be excluded, the ground must usually be some reason other than
that exclusion will assist the determination of truth.

Categorisation difficulties
How reliable a statement is depends on all the circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, attempts to sort out prescribed categories of reliable evidence are
doomed to failure. Consider the exception for spontaneous exclamations in
response to a startling event. The Commission has confidence that this exception
can be limited narrowly to cases in which there is a negligible chance of concoction
or distortion. 4 But even if so-not so easy a matter, I think-this possibility of
insincere statement is only one possible source of inaccuracy. The possibility of
misperception may be considerably more significant in this context, and past a point
the stress of excitement tends to undermine rather than enhance perceptive
ability. 5
Inevitably, rule makers feel pressed to allow trial courts discretionary power to
admit hearsay that does not fit within any previously defined exception. That is the
course that the Federal Rules of Evidence have taken,6 and now the Law
Commission expressly

recommends following their

lead. 7

The

Commission

expresses the intent that this be "a very limited discretion"8-a rather ironic
development, given that the Senate Committee that shaped the Federal Rules'

4 paras 8.115-8.120. cf. David Ormerod, " Redundant Res Gestae?" [1998] Crim.LR. 301,
which reflects, in my view, an appropriate disdain for the res gestae exceptions and an
unwarranted confidence in the other exceptions, including the "safety valve" exception, that
the Law Commission would create or preserve.
5 See, e.g. Andrew Ashworth and Rosemary Pattenden, "Reliability, Hearsay Evidence and
the English Criminal Trial" (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 292 at 330.
6 See Fed. R. Evid. 807, a recent creation substantially identical to the prior Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5).
7 paras 6.48-6.53.
8 para. 6.49 (emphasis in original).
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residual exception strongly expressed a similar intention, 9 and that the courts have
run roughshod over it. '0 The analysis presented here will, I hope, support the view
that, to the extent the concern is truth determination, a "safety valve" exception of
this sort is inadequately receptive to hearsay, and to the extent that a fundamental
right is at stake such an exception tends to undermine it.
Unreliable evidence

as

an aid to determination of truth

Evidence need not be particularly reliable to aid the search for truth. Suppose that
testifying to proposition X would be in a witness's self-interest and that the witness
in fact testifies to

X. Suppose further we make an assessment that the witness would

be essentially certain to testify to X if it is true but that if X were false the probability
would still be 50 per cent that the witness would testify to it. In these circumstances,
the evidence is hardly reliable, and yet-assuming for the moment that the jury does

not overvalue it-it clearly helps in truth-determination, much like evidence that the
defendant has the same common blood type as a stain left by the perpetrator at the
crime scene. Indeed, a rational factfinder would conclude that the testimony
X 11
doubles the prior odds of .
One piece of unreliable evidence presumably will be unpersuasive to the jury and
insufficient to support a verdict.But sufficiency is determined on the basis of the
entirety of the evidence; an accumulation of unreliable evidence may be very
persuasive. In determining admissibility of a single item of evidence, if the aim is to
advance the search for truth, the basic question is not an aggregate but a marginal
one,

whether the aggregate of evidence is better with or without that item

included---or, put another way, whether that item is more probative than preju
dicial.
It is helpful to bear in mind in this context that the paradigm of acceptable
evidence, live testimony of a witness subject to cross-examination, need not be
particularly reliable to assist in truth-determination. And yet courts do not generally
purport to determine the reliability of testimony as a prerequisite for admitting it.
Indeed, whenever there is a conflict of testimony, it is clear that the testimony of at
least one of the witnesses-and perhaps that of both-is not only unreliable but
false. But both are ordinarily admitted without question.
The jury's consideration of hearsay
It has become commonplace to assume that the jury's presumed inability to
account sufficiently for the defects of hearsay is a primary reason for the exclu
sionary rule-and, correspondingly, that the general absence of the jury from

9 Sen. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), at 20, reprinted in Am.Jur.2d, New
Topic Service: Federal Rules of Evidence (1975): "It is intended that the residual exceptions will
be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."
10
See, e.g. Myrna Raeder, "The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red
Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured" (1994) 25 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 925 at
933.
11
This is a simple application of Bayes' Theorem, which provides that the posterior odds of
a proposition equal the prior odds times the likelihood ratio. The prior odds are assessed
without considering the evidence in question, and the posterior odds take that evidence into
account. The numerator of the likelihood ratio is the probability that the evidence in question
would arise if the proposition were true, and the denominator is the probability that the
evidence would arise if that proposition were false.
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English civil litigation accounts for the abolition of the rule in civil cases. 12 For
several reasons, I believe the explanation is unconvincing.
First, this defective-jury explanation for the hearsay rule seems to have become
prominent only in the nineteenth century,13 well after the rule had begun to emerge,
and long after the confrontation principle on which I will focus had become
established.
Secondly, empirical evidence supporting the defective-jury explanation is alto
gether lacking. Such empirical evidence as there is suggests that jurors do not fail to
discount hearsay evidence to take its weaknesses into account. 14 Indeed, there is
some suggestion that in some circumstances jurors may tend to discount hearsay too
much rather than too little.15
Thirdly, it must always be borne in mind that hearsay can be highly probative
evidence. To conclude that truth-determination will be advanced rather than
hindered by exclusion of an item of hearsay requires more than merely that the
jurors will overvalue the hearsay. It requires that they will overvalue it by so much
that they are led further away from the truth than if they had never heard it-that
in some sense they will give the evidence more than twice the weight it should have.
That is a very high degree of overvaluation. Assuming that live testimony of the
declarant as to a given proposition would be more probative than prejudicial, 16 then
usually the declarant's hearsay statement asserting that proposition will be as
well.
Necessity and the "best evidence" rationale
The Law Commission also points to necessity as a crucial criterion in determin
ing the admissibility of hearsay. 1 7 But how much does this factor add to the analysis?
There is need for good evidence and no need for bad evidence. If a material
proposition is in dispute and an item of evidence bearing on that proposition is more
probative than prejudicial, there is need for the evidence; if it is more prejudicial
than probative, there is no need for it, and the fact that the declarant is unavailable
should not render it admissible.
Perhaps that analysis is too glib, though not by very much. I think the necessity
criterion fails because it operates from the premise that most hearsay is not of net
assistance to truth determination. The analysis above suggests that the premise
12

See, e.g. Tapper, supra, at 777.
See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence
(1942), at 36, and "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept" (1948) 62
Harv. L. Rev. 177, 182-83. A famous, and perhaps seminal, expression of the jury-defect view
was that of Mansfield, C.J., in Re Berkeley, 4 Camp. 401, 415, 171 E.R. 128, 135 (H.L. 1811).
He said that the different attitudes towards hearsay in Scotland and in England "seem to me
to have a reasonable foundation in the different manner in which justice is administered in the
two countries." In Scotland, as in most of the Continent, judges were the finders of fact, and
they could "trust themselves entirely" to give hearsay such little weight as it seemed to them
to deserve. "But in England, where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay is properly
excluded, because no man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds."
14 See, e.g. Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park and Steven D. Penrod, "Jurors'
Perceptions of Eyewimesses and Hearsay Evidence" (l 992) 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703.
1 5 See Peter Miene, Roger C. Park and Eugene Borgida, "Juror Decision Making and the
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence" (l 992) 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683.
1 6 This may be in doubt, for example, if the proposition has dubious relevance to the case
but potential inflammatory impact.
17 e.g. para. 6.l.
13
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should be reversed. And then the inverse of a necessity argument comes more
sharply into view. The point is not that in some cases hearsay should be admitted
because the unavailability of the declarant renders the hearsay necessary. Rather, it
is that in some cases, even though the hearsay would be net beneficial to the truth
determination process, the availability of the declarant means that exclusion may
advance the truth-determination process by inducing proponents to produce better
evidence-the testimony of the declarant, taken subject to oath and cross
examination. 1 8
Although the Law Commission expressly disclaimed reliance on a "best evi
dence" rationale, 19 I submit that this is the best justification for taking a sharply
more receptive attitude towards hearsay when the declarant is unavailable. 20 But,
even where the declarant is readily available, this rationale does not justify a broad
exclusion of hearsay. Assuming the evidence is more probative than prejudicial, and
that the proponent is not (and was not) substantially better able than the opponent
to produce the declarant, there is a ready response to the opponent who argues that
the live testimony of the declarant would be better evidence than the hearsay:
"Produce her yourself." The evidence that the proponent has chosen to lead is, by
hypothesis, more beneficial than detrimental to truth-determination; if the oppo
nent hopes to do better by the presentation of other evidence, including the live
testimony of the declarant, then it is her choice to do so. Granted, doing so does not
put the opponent in as favourable a position as he would have if the proponent
presented the declarant as a wimess and the opponent then cross-examined. But if
this is a problem (I am unsure whether it is), the best solution is an adjustment of
procedure rather than outright exclusion of probative evidence.21
Summary

If truth-determination is all that is at stake, the elimination of hearsay in civil
cases and the proposals of the Law Commission for criminal cases are steps in the
right direction, though perhaps complete abrogation went somewhat too far in that
direction and the Law Commission does not go quite far enough.22 If the live
testimony of the declarant would assist truth determination, then usually so too will
the hearsay statement. The "best evidence" rationale might support exclusion of
hearsay in some circumstances, but at least for the most part only if the proponent
1 8 In some cases, the hearsay may appear to be better evidence than testimony, because the
hearsay reflects a fresher memory. But the testimony can, if appropriate, be supplemented by
the hearsay; testimony under oath and cross-examination supplemented by the prior statement
is bound to be better evidence than the prior statement alone.
19 paras 6.17-6.32.
20 T
hus, the Law Commission recommends a broad hearsay exception for statements made
by declarants unavailable at trial. Arguably, though, a predicate for the exception should be
that the proponent did not have adequate opportunity to take the wimess's deposition before
trial. Note that failure of the proponent to take such an opportunity may, in some
circumstances, preclude a finding of unavailability under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(5).
21
I have proposed a procedural solution: If the opponent secures the presence of the
declarant, willing and able to testify, by a prescribed time, then the proponent is obligated to
present her live testimony of forgo the use of the hearsay. See "Improving the Procedure for
Resolving Hearsay Issues" (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 883. I express further thoughts on the
matter in "Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation" (1998) 49 Hastings
L.J. (forthcoming).
22 cf. J.
R. Spencer, "Hearsay Reform: A Bridge not Far Enough?" [1996] Crim.LR. 29.
© SWEET & MAxwELL
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is or was substantially better able than the opponent to produce the declarant as a
wimess subject to oath and cross-examination.

The Confrontation Principle
Now shift gears. Let us consider the requirements that a legal system should
impose on witnesses offering testimony against an accused, not merely to assist in
truth determination but as a matter of procedural right.23 Ideally, testimony should
be given:
(I) under oath, or some other procedure designed to ensure that the wimess
is at risk for false statement;
(2) subject to cross-examination by the accused or counsel;

(3) in the presence of the accused; and
(4) in the presence of the trier of fact.
For nearly half a millennium, at least since Thomas Smith described a criminal
trial as an "altercation" between accusing wimess and defendant, these conditions
have described the norm under which common law trials have been held.24 These
conditions are hardly unique to the common law system. The oath has been
required by many systems at least since Roman times. And the Book of Acts, 25: 16,
quotes the Roman governor Festus as declaring:
"It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he
which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for
himself concerning the crime laid against him."
Not all legal systems, however, impose all these conditions as a matter of course.
Indeed, Continental systems traditionally took testimony out of the presence of the
parties, in a closed proceeding. And for hundreds of years, English commentators
declared the superiority of the English system on this score.25
English adherence to these principles was by no means uncluttered, however. For
one thing, the fourth condition-that testimony be taken before the trier of
fact-has always been regarded as a rule of preference; if the witness is unavailable
at trial, a pretrial deposition will suffice. Indeed, notwithstanding the English
hostility towards Continental methods of taking testimony, by the middle of the
seventeenth century a sophisticated body of doctrine had developed governing when
23 I will not consider here the complex issue of the extent to which similar conditions should
apply to other testimony-other than to say that, without the power of the state to gather and
preserve evidence on the side of the proponent and the liberties of a criminal defendant on the
side of the opponent, there are good reasons for being more lax.
The historical discussion here is gleaned from research on the history of hearsay that I am
currently doing with Dr Michael Macnair-who has no share of blame for any inaccuracies
here.
24 Thomas Smith, De RepublicaAnglorum, Bk. 2, ch. 15, (c. 1565; Mary Dewar, ed., 1982),
at 114. Another condition, at least in the modem era, is that to the extent possible the witness
should give her affirmative testimony in her own words, rather than merely affirming or
denying a proposition put to her. See Walker Jameson Blakey, "Substantive Use of Prior
Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence" (1975) 64 Ky L.J.
3.42-3.43.
25 e.g. Case of the Union of the Realms, (1604) Moore (K.B.) 790, 798, 72 E.R. 908, 913
(Popham, L.C.J.); Sollon Emlyn, Preface to State Trials (1730); Matthew Hale, History of the
Common Law (c. 1670; C. M. Gray, ed., 1971), at 163-164.
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depositions taken in equity-a system following Continental models-could be
used at trial because of the unavailability of the witness. 26 Further, examinations
taken by a magistrate under oath could be used at trial if the witness was then
unavailable-but this practice was barred, absent cross-examination, in 1696 for
misdemeanour cases,27 and by the mid-nineteenth century in felony cases. 28 Finally,
defendants in politicised cases in England did not always have an opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses. From the early sixteenth century, treason defendants
frequently demanded that the witnesses be brought "face to face" with them to give
or affirm their testimony. 29 Sometimes the demands were granted, sometimes not.
But Parliament repeatedly supported the demands, with the "face to face"
formula, 30 and by the middle of the seventeenth century, the principle was well
established.31

Thence,

the

principle

passed

to America,32

eventually

being

enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Bill of Rights.
Though the history is not as neat as one might wish, I believe it suggests that the
first three conditions set forth above are, and for the most part have long been
recognised to be, indispensable: testimony given without satisfying them is not
acceptable. Thus, if a witness refuses to give satisfactory recognition of an obligation
of truth-telling, or to testify in the presence of the accused, or to submit to cross
examination, the testimony should be rejected. Perhaps more moderate rules should
be adopted for child witnesses or those suffering a substantial mental disability33; I
prefer not to express an opinion on this issue here.34 Apart from these troublesome
cases, I believe that only one qualification to this principle should be recognised: if
26
e.g. Fortescue v. Coake, Godb. 193, 78 E.R. 117 (Com. Pleas, 1612); Anon., Godb. 326,
78 E.R. 192 (K.B. 1623); Rushworth v. Countess de Pembroke & Currier, (1668) Hardres 472,
145 E.R. 553. Note Gilbert's comment on Rushworth in his Treatise on Evidence (1760 ed.),
at 45: "A Deposition can't be given in Evidence against any Person that was not Party to the
Suit, and the Reason is, because he had not Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses, and 'tis
against natural Justice that a Man should be concluded in a Cause to which he never was a
Party."
This law developed more rapidly and systematically in civil cases, in part because of the
presence of counsel there and in part because of the use, discussed in the text, in criminal cases
of examinations taken before magistrates.
27
R. v. Paine, (1696) 1 Salk. 281, 91 E.R. 246.
28
R. v. Forbes, (1814) Holt 599, 171 E.R. 354; Stat. 11 & 12 Viet. c. 42. s.17 (1848).
29
Note, for example, the trial of the Duke of Buckingham in 1521, recounted by
Shakespeare in King Henry VIII, II:1, on the basis of contemporary sources; R. v. Rice ap
Griffit h (1531), in 1 J. H. Baker, ed., T he Reports of Sir John Spelman, 93 Publications of the
Selden Society (1976), Corone, pl. 12, p.47, at 48; Seymour's Case, (1549) 1 How.St.Tr. 483,
492; Duke of Somerset's Trial, (1551) 1 How.St.Tr. 515, 517, 520; Raleigh's Trial, (1603) 2
How.St.Tr. at 15, 18, 19, 23.
30 See, e.g. Stats. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 11, s.9; 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 10, s.11; 1 Eliz. 1, ch. 5,
s.10; 13 Eliz. 1, ch. 1, s.9.
31 See, e.g. Trial of John Lilburne, (1649) 4 How.St.Tr. at 1329.
32 e.g., Massachusetts Const., pt. I, art. XII (1780), Richard L. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties
(1955), at 376 (right of accused "to meet the witnesses against him face to face").
33 See, e.g. Maryland v. Craig, (1990) 497 U.S. 836.
34 Factors distinguishing these cases from that of the ordinary adult witness include: (I) the
higher possibility of trauma of the child or disabled witness; (2) the higher probability that the
child or disabled witness will be psychologically unable to testify under ordinary procedures,
especially in the presence of the defendant; (3) the virtual worthlessness, in many cases, of the
opportunity for cross-examining such witnesses; and (4) the lack of understanding and
independence on the part of such a witness, making compulsion on any morally tolerable
terms impractical.
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the witness's unavailability or inability to give testimony under satisfactory condi
tions is attributable to the wrongdoing of the accused, then the accused should be
deemed to have forfeited his objection to testimony not given under those
conditions.35 I do not believe that this qualification should be extended to the
situation in which the witness is afraid to testify but the fear cannot be attributed to
wrongdoing of the accused; in light of the problems of proof that this extension
avoids, however, the temptation to adopt it, as England has done,36 is easily enough
understood.
Note that in this analysis I have not referred to hearsay. And it is notable that the
recent European cases, without suggesting anything remotely resembling the
common law of hearsay-and with little or no attention to matters of reliability
nevertheless recognise a fundamental right of the accused under Articles 6(1) and
6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights to examine an adverse
witness. 37 With only very limited exceptions, the accused must be able to exercise
his opportunity face to face with the witness.38
And yet the right would be virtually nullified if the prosecutor could argue
successfully, "Very well. The person who observed the crime has not given

15 This old principle has been recognised in a new rule, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). I discuss
it in "Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa" (1997) 31 Israel L. Rev. 506.
36 See Criminai Justice Act 1988, s.23(3).
37 See, e.g. van Mechelen v. Netherlands (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 647, 673, para. 51:
[A]ll the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the presence of the
accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but
they must not infringe the rights of the defence; as a general rule, paragraphs l and 3(d)
of Article 6 require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper opportunity to
challenge and question a witness against him, either when he makes his statements or at
a later stage.
See also, e.g. Saidi v. France (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 251, 270, para. 44 (September 20, 1993)
("The lack of any confrontation deprived him in certain respects of a fair trial."); Kostovski v.
Netherlands (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 434, 448-49, para. 41.
38 In Doorson v. Netherlands (l 996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330, the court held, over two dissents, that
the Convention was not violated when wimesses in a drug case were permitted to testify
anonymously, out of the defendant's presence. The Court based this decision on the ground
that the wimesses might have feared the defendants; like s.23(3) of the English Criminal
Justice Act 1988, the Court did not require that wrongdoing by the defendant be the cause of
the fear. The Court emphasised, however, that it would have been preferable had the wimesses
testified in the presence of the defendant, and that the procedure used by the Dutch courts in
this case should not be used routinely. ibid. at 359. It also appears to have been crucial to the
decision that counsel was able to question the wimesses at the appellate stage, ibid. at 359, and
that the finding of guilt was not based "solely or to a decisive extent" on the evidence of these
wimesses, ibid. at 360. Moreover, Doorson was, it appears, severely limited in van Meche/en v.
Netherlands (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 647. There, the defendants and counsel were in a separate
room during the examination of key wimesses, though they were able to listen to the
examination and ask questions through a sound link. The Court held that "such extreme
limitations on the right of the accused to have the evidence against them given in their
presence" had not been justified, para. 60, and it distinguished Doorson on several grounds,
including that the wimesses in van Meche/en were police officers rather than civilians and that
their evidence had been of decisive importance.
Perhaps a more disturbing aspect of Doorson is the portion of the majority decision declining
to hold a violation on the basis of the use of a statement made to the police by a wimess who
then absconded, and whom the defendant never had a chance to examine. Presumably,
though, this decision was based on the fear consideration; it also seems to have been supported
by the fact that the witness's statement was, at least in part, cumulative of other evidence: 22
E.H.R.R. at 361.
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testimony under adequate conditions. But here is a witness who will testify in court,
under all the usual conditions, as to what that person said." To protect the
testimonial system, then, it becomes necessary to have a narrow rule not excluding
hearsay in general but barring secondhand evidence of testimonial statements that
were not taken under conditions required for proper testimony.39
The question, of course, then becomes how to define testimonial statements for
this purpose-a problem especially tricky given that the definition to serve its
purpose must extend to some statements not made under the usual conditions for
testimony. The essence, I believe, is this: a statement should be considered
testimonial if the effect of admitting evidence of the statement would be that
persons in circumstances similar to the declarant could knowingly create evidence
for trial.40 Put another way, the statement is testimonial if treating it as admissible
gives witnesses a method of testifying, whether in or out of court, formally or
informally. Roughly speaking, the statement is testimonial if the declarant antici
pates that it will be used in the prosecution of crime.41
I do not pretend that determination of whether a statement is testimonial is
always a simple matter. Usually it is reasonably straightforward, though. Some rules
of thumb can help. For example, a statement made knowingly to the authorities
describing criminal activity is almost always testimonial. A statement made in the
course of going about one's ordinary business-whether legitimate or not-is not
usually testimonial.
That there are sometimes difficult cases-as of course there are under the current
system and as there would be under the Law Commission's system-should not
blind us to the great advantages of the system I am proposing. I will now discuss
these.

Benefits of this approach
I have argued that: (I) most hearsay should be presumptively admissible; but that
(2) testimonial statements, however made, should not be treated as appropriate
evidence unless they were made under satisfactory conditions; (3) the right to cross-

39 If the witness makes the statement under unsatisfactory conditions, but then repeats it
under satisfactory ones, I do not believe there is a problem. But if, when the witness testifies
subject to adverse examination, she fails to reaffirm the substance of the prior substance in any
material respect, I believe that the accused's opportunity to examine the witness is seriously
undermined, in a way that neither the United States Supreme Court, the Strasbourg Court,
nor the Law Commission has fully recognised. Compare my article, "Prior Statements of a
Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket" 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 277, with California
v. Green, (1970) 399 U.S. 149 and para. 5.21 of the Law Commission Report (discussing X
v. FRG Appl. 8414178, (1980) 17 D & R 231).
40 The Law Commission notes that the meaning of the word "witness" according to the
Strasbourg Court goes beyond its usual meaning to an English lawyer, para. 5.6, but asserts
that so far it extends only to "people who have fed information, consciously and voluntarily,
into the criminal justice system." Para. 5.7. I think this is essentially the right approach
except that I would delete reference to voluntariness, given that many witnesses testify under
some form of pressure.
41 This approach is similar in some respects to the views espoused by the Government in
W7iite v. Illinois, (1992) 502 U.S. 346, by Justice Thomas in his separate opinion in that case,
and by Prof. Akhil Amar in The Constitution and Criminal Procedure (1997) and in "Foreword:
Sixth Amendment First Principles" (1995) 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 688-697. I discuss these views
at greater length in " First Principles'', supra.
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examine under oath or some equivalent should be regarded as indispensable, and
probably so too should the right to have the examination taken in the defendant's
presence; and (4) at least putting aside the cases of child and mentally disabled
witnesses, these requirements should be subject only to the qualification that the
accused forfeits any objection to a testimonial statement if his own wrongdoing
accounts for the inability to take the testimony under satisfactory conditions.
This system reflects what I think has always been the most important principle
behind the hearsay rule, the principle that continues to restrain common law
jurisdictions from doing away with the rule altogether in criminal cases, and the one
that is behind the European cases-the principle that if someone testifies against a
criminal defendant, the defendant has a right to have the testimony taken under
oath, face to face and subject to cross-examination. Any yet, like the European
cases, it reflects this principle without depending on the utterly unsatisfactory law of
hearsay.
Indeed, this approach helps explain some features of the current system that
appear anomalous and provides a reasoned basis for eliminating others. Consider
first the underlying rationale for limitations on hearsay. If all that were at stake were
truth-determination, there would be good grounds, as Professor Tapper argues,42
for integration of the law of hearsay in civil and criminal cases. But the analysis here,
like the European cases, suggests that a basic right of the accused is at stake with
respect to some prosecution hearsay, and this factor amply justifies a sharp
differentiation in treatment. A similar consideration accounts for the persistence of
limitations on hearsay in criminal cases not tried by a jury4'; the European cases
suggest that exclusion is not dependent on the nature of the trier of fact.
Basing a limited exclusion of hearsay on the defendant's right to confront
accusing witnesses also sheds light on another anomaly discussed by Professor
Tapper, the existence of a "massive exception" favouring the prosecution, for
admissions and confessions, and no comparable exception favouring the defence.44
The system advocated here is far more receptive than current law to hearsay
presented by the defendant. At the same time, it easily explains the core of
admissions doctrine: if the statement is the defendant's own, there is no adverse
witness to confront. Moreover, the theory also explains receptivity to statements
made in furtherance of a conspiracy, a doctrine that the Law Commission made no
attempt to justify except as "a pragmatic one", without which it "might be hard to
prove a conspiracy". 45 The explanation is that if a statement was made in
furtherance of a conspiracy it was not testimonial, but merely an act in the course
of the conspiracy's business.
Consider also the definition of hearsay, a matter addressed at considerable length
by the Law Commission.46 Particularly pressing, in light of R.
problem raised by Wright

v.

v.

Kearley,47 is the

Doe d Tatham,48 of conduct offered to prove an

uncommunicated belief that assertedly motivated the actor. Under the current
structure of the law-a basic structure that the Law Commission would not alter-it
42

(1997) Crim.L.R. at 774.
at 777.

43 ibid.
44 ibid.

para. 8.131.
paras 7.01-7.41.
47 (1992) 2 A.C. 228, HL.
48 4 Bing. (N.C.) 489, 132 E.R. 877 (H.L. 1838).
45

46
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is critical whether or not such conduct is categorised as hearsay. But neither
alternative is attractive. Evidence of this sort can have great probative value; hence
the impetus to admit it. On the other hand, it seems quite odd to hold that conduct
is more probative of a given proposition if it does not assert that proposition, a factor
that may make the conduct far more ambiguous than most hearsay. Under the
system presented here, little or nothing would turn on whether the conduct is
categorised as hearsay, for there would be no presumptive exclusion of hearsay. And
ordinarily the conduct is not testimonial in nature; not only did it not communicate
the proposition at issue, but in virtually all cases it occurred before litigation
appeared to the actor to be in prospect. Thus, there usually would be no reason to
exclude the evidence.
Indeed, more broadly, this system would eliminate the fruitless attempt to sort
out reliable evidence from unreliable. The Law Commission's attempt to solve this
problem with a residual exception is likely to create the same result as its American
model: in some cases inadequacy in admitting probative evidence, in others
violation of the accused's right to confront adverse witnesses, and throughout
unpredictability in the exercise of discretion.
Similarly, the Law Commission's creation of a broad exception for statements by
declarants unavailable at trial49 is disquieting. To the extent that this exception
would apply to non-testimonial statements, it is unnecessary under the system I am
proposing. With respect to testimonial statements-which by definition must have
been made in anticipation of litigation-most cases will fall into either of two
categories. In some cases, the witness's unavailability is caused by the defendant's
wrongdoing, and there the forfeiture principle applies. In others, the prosecution
could have taken the witness's testimony under adequate conditions while she was
still available, thus preserving it for trial, and the prosecution should be held to
account for failure to do so.50 The Law Commission's proposal provides for the case
in which the proponent of the evidence procures the unavailability of the witness, 51
but it gives the prosecution no incentive to preserve testimony subject to oath and
cross-examination. Furthermore, if the prosecutor's hands are clean the proposal
allows the Crown to use as a matter of course unsworn police station statements of
witnesses who have since become unavailable. And it appears that, so long as a rape
counsellor maintains independence from the prosecution, he could take an unsworn
videotaped statement from a complainant and advise her that, if she happened to be
unavailable at the time of trial, the video would be placed in the hands of the
prosecution and could be admissible evidence.
The theory advocated here also suggests that the Lord Chief Justice was correct
in criticising a recent Home Office proposal to bar unrepresented defendants from
personally cross-examining the complainant in cases of rape and serious sexual
assault, and to create a general discretionary prohibition in the case of other crimes
49

paras 8.03-8.47; draft bill, ss.3, 5.
See, e.g. Forbes, supra. In the narrow case in which: (1) a witness made a testimonial
statement favourable to the prosecution but not under proper conditions; (2) the defendant
has not acted improperly; and (3) the prosecution did not have a reasonable opportunity to
preserve the witness's testimony before trial under suitable conditions, I believe that the
prosecution, the proponent of the evidence, rather than the defendant, the beneficiary of the
confrontation right, should bear the risk that: ( 4) the witness will be unavailable to testify at
trial.
5 1 para. 8.30; draft bill, s. 9.
50
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and wimesses. 52 One may well doubt the motives of a defendant who chooses to
examine an accusing wimess personally, rather than to rely on the skill of a trained
advocate. But personal examination-truly face-to-face-is, after all, the most
direct as well as traditional method of confrontation. The wimess's legitimate
interests should be guarded not by denying a longstanding right of the defendant
but by preparing the wimess, supporting her, protecting her against violence,
intimidation, and abusive examination, and if need be providing representation for
her. The process may still be extremely difficult for her-as it often is even when
examination is conducted by counsel. A necessary consequence not only of the
confrontation right but of the very notion of a trial is that giving testimony,
especially against a criminal defendant, is indeed a trying experience, testing,
rigorous, and adversarial. Gratuitous trauma should be prevented, of course. But we
cannot eliminate trauma from the process without gutting the system.
At least these proposals by the Home Office do not appear to violate the demands
of the European cases. The same cannot be said for the approach of the Law
Commission. Indeed, the Law Commission appears to acknowledge some difficulty
in reconciling its approach with those demands. 53 Rather than trying to limit the
effectiveness of those cases, the Law Commission, in my butt-innish trans-Atlantic
view, should have embraced them. They represent an international victory for a
right long championed by the common law, though too often hidden in the bog of
hearsay law. And, given the prospective incorporation of the European Convention,
those cases indicate one more crucial advantage of the system I propose: it is legally
valid!

52 Home Office, Report of the Interdeparrmental Working Group on the Trearment of
Vulnerable or Intimidated W itnesses in the Criminal Justice System, Speaking up for Justice
Gune 1998). The comments of the Lord Chief Justice are reported in The Times, July 29, 1998,
p. l .
53 paras 5.13-5.20.
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